Christoph Egger Université Paris Cité, CNRS, IRIF Bâtiment Sophie Germain, Office 4058 8 Place Aurélie Nemours, 75013 Paris Email: Christoph.Egger@irif.fr Jabber: christoph@egger.im PGP
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I am a researcher at Institut de Recherche en Informatique Fondamentale (IRIF) since fall 2022 where I explore connections betweencryptography and complexity theory. A central theme is the use of space bounds and fine-grained complexity towards a qualitatively different perspective on the foundations of cryptography. During my doctoral studies I worked on formalization and proof techniques to manage large real-world systems and establishing solid foundations to asses non-cryptographic aspects of anonymity among other topics. As a master student I worked on Modal Logic and Category Theory and as a Bachelor Student on Anonymous Communication and Software Product Lines. I am also a founding member of the FAUST CTF team and its own competition, FAUST-CTF. Finally I am a Free Software person. I have been a Debian Developer for more than 10 years and have contributed to a variety of software projects including the Linux kernel and the Git version control system.
Currently I am working on connections between complexity theory and cryptography. In particular I am interested in computational security outside the relativizing setting as well as work to better understand minicrypt security.
My most recent results concern cryptographic proofs: Composability (both in the classical Universal Composability interpretation as well as composition and modularization of proofs) and extending security from cryptographic primitives towards their concrete use (for example concerning Ring Signatures and Steganography).
In the past I have worked, among other things, on System Software Engineering and Software Product Lines, Coalgebraic Modal Logic and Anonymity Networks.
I am a Debian Developer since December 2009, my first contributions go back to 2016. From roughly 2010 to 2016 I have been a core member of the kFreeBSD team supporting this rather unusual combination of BSD and GNU components. Additionally, many small contributions to different Free Software projects are the result of my Debian work. I have initiated the internationalization effort of Unknown Horizons originally implementing its multi-language support. As a research assistant in the VAMOS research project I contributed more than 50 changes to the Linux Kernel. I also added public key pinning support to the Git version control system.
- Math in Greater Paris: Two-Year postdoctoral fellowship cofunded by EU H2020 Marie Sklodowska-Curie Action and FSMP
In summer 2021 Viktoria Ronge and I designed and taught a one-week summer school course for high-school students. Focus of the course was on cryptographic methodology and zero-knowledge proof systems. Also with Viktoria Ronge in Fall 2019 I organized a (graduate level) seminar on privacy notions.
In addition I have been (co-)responsible for the exercise sessions in multiple courses including "Secure Multi-Party Computation", "Password Based Cryptography" and blockchain-related lectures.
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/scn/BrzuskaCEKM24, author = {Chris Brzuska and Geoffroy Couteau and Christoph Egger and Pihla Karanko and Pierre Meyer}, editor = {Clemente Galdi and Duong Hieu Phan}, title = {Instantiating the Hash-Then-Evaluate Paradigm: Strengthening PRFs, PCFs, and OPRFs}, booktitle = {Security and Cryptography for Networks - 14th International Conference, {SCN} 2024, Amalfi, Italy, September 11-13, 2024, Proceedings, Part {II}}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {14974}, pages = {97--116}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2024}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71073-5\_5}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-71073-5\_5}, timestamp = {Wed, 18 Sep 2024 20:54:03 +0200}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/scn/BrzuskaCEKM24.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/acns/BrzuskaEP24, author = {Chris Brzuska and Christoph Egger and Kirthivaasan Puniamurthy}, editor = {Christina P{\"{o}}pper and Lejla Batina}, title = {CryptoZoo: {A} Viewer for Reduction Proofs}, booktitle = {Applied Cryptography and Network Security - 22nd International Conference, {ACNS} 2024, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, March 5-8, 2024, Proceedings, Part {I}}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {14583}, pages = {3--25}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2024}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54770-6\_1}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-54770-6\_1}, timestamp = {Sun, 04 Aug 2024 19:42:38 +0200}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/acns/BrzuskaEP24.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/csfw/ChowELRW23, author = {Sherman S. M. Chow and Christoph Egger and Russell W. F. Lai and Viktoria Ronge and Ivy K. Y. Woo}, title = {On Sustainable Ring-Based Anonymous Systems}, booktitle = {36th {IEEE} Computer Security Foundations Symposium, {CSF} 2023, Dubrovnik, Croatia, July 10-14, 2023}, pages = {568--583}, publisher = {{IEEE}}, year = {2023}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00035}, doi = {10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00035}, timestamp = {Sun, 12 Nov 2023 02:10:15 +0100}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/csfw/ChowELRW23.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/asiacrypt/BrzuskaDEFKK22, author = {Chris Brzuska and Antoine Delignat{-}Lavaud and Christoph Egger and C{\'{e}}dric Fournet and Konrad Kohbrok and Markulf Kohlweiss}, editor = {Shweta Agrawal and Dongdai Lin}, title = {Key-Schedule Security for the {TLS} 1.3 Standard}, booktitle = {Advances in Cryptology - {ASIACRYPT} 2022 - 28th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Taipei, Taiwan, December 5-9, 2022, Proceedings, Part {I}}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {13791}, pages = {621--650}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2022}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22963-3\_21}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-22963-3\_21}, timestamp = {Mon, 05 Feb 2024 20:33:21 +0100}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/asiacrypt/BrzuskaDEFKK22.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
In a ring-signature-based anonymous cryptocurrency, signers of a transaction are hidden among a set of potential signers, called a ring, whose size is much smaller than the number of all users. The ringmembership relations specified by the sets of transactions thus induce bipartite transaction graphs, whose distribution is in turn induced by the ring sampler underlying the cryptocurrency. Since efficient graph analysis could be performed on transaction graphs to potentially deanonymise signers, it is crucial to understand the resistance of (the transaction graphs induced by) a ring sampler against graph analysis. Of particular interest is the class of partitioning ring samplers. Although previous works showed that they provide almost optimal local anonymity, their resistance against global, e.g. graph-based, attacks were unclear. In this work, we analyse transaction graphs induced by partitioning ring samplers. Specifically, we show (partly analytically and partly empirically) that, somewhat surprisingly, by setting the ring size to be at least logarithmic in the number of users, a graph-analysing adversary is no better than the one that performs random guessing in deanonymisation up to constant factor of 2.
@article{DBLP:journals/popets/EggerLRWY22, author = {Christoph Egger and Russell W. F. Lai and Viktoria Ronge and Ivy K. Y. Woo and Hoover H. F. Yin}, title = {On Defeating Graph Analysis of Anonymous Transactions}, journal = {Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.}, volume = {2022}, number = {3}, pages = {538--557}, year = {2022}, url = {https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2022-0085}, doi = {10.56553/POPETS-2022-0085}, timestamp = {Mon, 26 Jun 2023 20:56:36 +0200}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/journals/popets/EggerLRWY22.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ccs/00010R0KS21, author = {Mike Graf and Daniel Rausch and Viktoria Ronge and Christoph Egger and Ralf K{\"{u}}sters and Dominique Schr{\"{o}}der}, editor = {Yongdae Kim and Jong Kim and Giovanni Vigna and Elaine Shi}, title = {A Security Framework for Distributed Ledgers}, booktitle = {{CCS} '21: 2021 {ACM} {SIGSAC} Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Virtual Event, Republic of Korea, November 15 - 19, 2021}, pages = {1043--1064}, publisher = {{ACM}}, year = {2021}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3485362}, doi = {10.1145/3460120.3485362}, timestamp = {Sun, 02 Oct 2022 15:56:14 +0200}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ccs/00010R0KS21.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
A ring signature scheme allows the signer to sign on behalf of an ad hoc set of users, called a ring. The verifier can be convinced that a ring member signs, but cannot point to the exact signer. Ring signatures have become increasingly important today with their deployment in anonymous cryptocurrencies. Conventionally, it is implicitly assumed that all ring members are equally likely to be the signer. This assumption is generally false in reality, leading to various practical and devastating deanonymizing attacks in Monero, one of the largest anonymous cryptocurrencies. These attacks highlight the unsatisfactory situation that how a ring should be chosen is poorly understood.
We propose an analytical model of ring samplers towards a deeper understanding of them through systematic studies. Our model helps to describe how anonymous a ring sampler is with respect to a given signer distribution as an information-theoretic measure. We show that this measure is robust – it only varies slightly when the signer distribution varies slightly. We then analyze three natural samplers – uniform, mimicking, and partitioning – under our model with respect to a family of signer distributions modeled after empirical Bitcoin data. We hope that our work paves the way towards researching ring samplers from a theoretical point of view.
@article{DBLP:journals/popets/RongeELSY21, author = {Viktoria Ronge and Christoph Egger and Russell W. F. Lai and Dominique Schr{\"{o}}der and Hoover H. F. Yin}, title = {Foundations of Ring Sampling}, journal = {Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.}, volume = {2021}, number = {3}, pages = {265--288}, year = {2021}, url = {https://doi.org/10.2478/popets-2021-0047}, doi = {10.2478/POPETS-2021-0047}, timestamp = {Mon, 26 Jun 2023 20:56:36 +0200}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/journals/popets/RongeELSY21.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
The development of Precision Medicine strategies requires high-dimensional phenotypic and genomic data, both of which are highly privacy-sensitive data types. Conventional data management systems lack the capabilities to sufficiently handle the expected large quantities of such sensitive data in a secure manner. PROMISE is a genetic data management concept that implements a highly secure platform for data exchange while preserving patient interests, privacy, and autonomy.
The concept of PROMISE to democratize genetic data was developed by an interdisciplinary team. It integrates a sophisticated cryptographic concept that allows only the patient to grant selective access to defined parts of his genetic information with single DNA base-pair resolution cryptography. The PROMISE system was developed for research purposes to evaluate the concept in a pilot study with nineteen cardiomyopathy patients undergoing genotyping, questionnaires, and longitudinal follow-up.
The safety of genetic data was very important to 79%, and patients generally regarded the data as highly sensitive. More than half the patients reported that their attitude towards the handling of genetic data has changed after using the PROMISE app for 4 months (median). The patients reported higher confidence in data security and willingness to share their data with commercial third parties, including pharmaceutical companies (increase from 5 to 32%).
PROMISE democratizes genomic data by a transparent, secure, and patient-centric approach. This clinical pilot study evaluating a genetic data infrastructure is unique and shows that patient’s acceptance of data sharing can be increased by patient-centric decision-making.
@Article{Amr2022, author="Amr, Ali and Hinderer, Marc and Griebel, Lena and Deuber, Dominic and Egger, Christoph and Sedaghat-Hamedani, Farbod and Kayvanpour, Elham and Huhn, Daniel and Haas, Jan and Frese, Karen and Schweig, Marc and Marnau, Ninja and Kr{\"a}mer, Annika and Durand, Claudia and Battke, Florian and Prokosch, Hans-Ulrich and Backes, Michael and Keller, Andreas and Schr{\"o}der, Dominique and Katus, Hugo A. and Frey, Norbert and Meder, Benjamin", title="Controlling my genome with my smartphone: first clinical experiences of the PROMISE system", journal="Clinical Research in Cardiology", year="2022", month="Jun", day="01", volume="111", number="6", pages="638--650", abstract="The development of Precision Medicine strategies requires high-dimensional phenotypic and genomic data, both of which are highly privacy-sensitive data types. Conventional data management systems lack the capabilities to sufficiently handle the expected large quantities of such sensitive data in a secure manner. PROMISE is a genetic data management concept that implements a highly secure platform for data exchange while preserving patient interests, privacy, and autonomy.", issn="1861-0692", doi="10.1007/s00392-021-01942-8", url="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00392-021-01942-8" }
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/mie/GriebelHAMSD0KK20, author = {Lena Griebel and Marc Hinderer and Ali Amr and Benjamin Meder and Marc Schweig and Dominic Deuber and Christoph Egger and Claudia Kawohl and Annika Kr{\"{a}}mer and Isabell Flade and Dominique Schr{\"{o}}der and Hans{-}Ulrich Prokosch}, editor = {Louise Bilenberg Pape{-}Haugaard and Christian Lovis and Inge Cort Madsen and Patrick Weber and Per Hostrup Nielsen and Philip Scott}, title = {The Patient as Genomic Data Manager - Evaluation of the {PROMISE} App}, booktitle = {Digital Personalized Health and Medicine - Proceedings of {MIE} 2020, Medical Informatics Europe, Geneva, Switzerland, April 28 - May 1, 2020}, series = {Studies in Health Technology and Informatics}, volume = {270}, pages = {1061--1065}, publisher = {{IOS} Press}, year = {2020}, url = {https://doi.org/10.3233/SHTI200324}, doi = {10.3233/SHTI200324}, timestamp = {Thu, 04 Apr 2024 17:06:52 +0200}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/mie/GriebelHAMSD0KK20.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ccs/Brost0LSSZ20, author = {Julian Brost and Christoph Egger and Russell W. F. Lai and Fritz Schmid and Dominique Schr{\"{o}}der and Markus Zoppelt}, editor = {Jay Ligatti and Xinming Ou and Jonathan Katz and Giovanni Vigna}, title = {Threshold Password-Hardened Encryption Services}, booktitle = {{CCS} '20: 2020 {ACM} {SIGSAC} Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Virtual Event, USA, November 9-13, 2020}, pages = {409--424}, publisher = {{ACM}}, year = {2020}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417266}, doi = {10.1145/3372297.3417266}, timestamp = {Sun, 02 Oct 2022 15:56:15 +0200}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ccs/Brost0LSSZ20.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ccs/0001MM19, author = {Christoph Egger and Pedro Moreno{-}Sanchez and Matteo Maffei}, editor = {Lorenzo Cavallaro and Johannes Kinder and XiaoFeng Wang and Jonathan Katz}, title = {Atomic Multi-Channel Updates with Constant Collateral in Bitcoin-Compatible Payment-Channel Networks}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2019 {ACM} {SIGSAC} Conference on Computer and Communications Security, {CCS} 2019, London, UK, November 11-15, 2019}, pages = {801--815}, publisher = {{ACM}}, year = {2019}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3345666}, doi = {10.1145/3319535.3345666}, timestamp = {Thu, 14 Oct 2021 09:58:24 +0200}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ccs/0001MM19.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
An individual’s genetic information is possibly the most valuable personal information. While knowledge of a person’s DNA sequence can facilitate the diagnosis of several heritable diseases and allow personalized treatment, its exposure comes with significant threats to the patient’s privacy. Currently known solutions for privacy-respecting computation require the owner of the DNA to either be heavily involved in the execution of a cryptographic protocol or to completely outsource the access control to a third party. This motivates the demand for cryptographic protocols which enable computation over encrypted genomic data while keeping the owner of the genome in full control. We envision a scenario where data owners can exercise arbitrary and dynamic access policies, depending on the intended use of the analysis results and on the credentials of who is conducting the analysis. At the same time, data owners are not required to maintain a local copy of their entire genetic data and do not need to exhaust their computational resources in an expensive cryptographic protocol.
In this work, we present METIS, a system that assists the computation over encrypted data stored in the cloud while leaving the decision on admissible computations to the data owner. It is based on garbled circuits and supports any polynomially-computable function. A critical feature of our system is that the data owner is free from computational overload and her communication complexity is independent of the size of the input data and only linear in the size of the circuit’s output. We demonstrate the practicality of our approach with an implementation and an evaluation of several functions over real datasets.
@article{DBLP:journals/popets/DeuberEFMSTBD19, author = {Dominic Deuber and Christoph Egger and Katharina Fech and Giulio Malavolta and Dominique Schr{\"{o}}der and Sri Aravinda Krishnan Thyagarajan and Florian Battke and Claudia Durand}, title = {My Genome Belongs to Me: Controlling Third Party Computation on Genomic Data}, journal = {Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.}, volume = {2019}, number = {1}, pages = {108--132}, year = {2019}, url = {https://doi.org/10.2478/popets-2019-0007}, doi = {10.2478/POPETS-2019-0007}, timestamp = {Mon, 05 Feb 2024 20:22:37 +0100}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/journals/popets/DeuberEFMSTBD19.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
Passwords and access control remain the popular choice for protecting sensitive data stored online, despite their well-known vulnerability to brute-force attacks. A natural solution is to use encryption. Although standard practices of using encryption somewhat alleviate the problem, decryption is often needed for utility, and keeping the decryption key within reach is obviously dangerous. To address this seemingly unavoidable problem in data security, we propose password-hardened encryption (PHE). With the help of an external crypto server, a service provider can recover the user data encrypted by PHE only when an end user supplied a correct password. PHE inherits the security features of password-hardening (Usenix Security ’15), adding protection for the user data. In particular, the crypto server does not learn any information about any user data. More importantly, both the crypto server and the service provider can rotate their secret keys, a proactive security mechanism mandated by the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). We build an extremely simple password-hardened encryption scheme. Compared with the state-of-the-art password-hardening scheme (Usenix Security ’17), our scheme only uses minimal number-theoretic operations and is, therefore, 30% - 50% more efficient. In fact, our extensive experimental evaluation demonstrates that our scheme can handle more than 525 encryption and (successful) decryption requests per second per core, which shows that it is lightweight and readily deployable in large-scale systems. Regarding security, our scheme also achieves a stronger soundness property, which puts less trust on the good behavior of the crypto server.
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/uss/Lai0RCMS18, author = {Russell W. F. Lai and Christoph Egger and Manuel Reinert and Sherman S. M. Chow and Matteo Maffei and Dominique Schr{\"{o}}der}, editor = {William Enck and Adrienne Porter Felt}, title = {Simple Password-Hardened Encryption Services}, booktitle = {27th {USENIX} Security Symposium, {USENIX} Security 2018, Baltimore, MD, USA, August 15-17, 2018}, pages = {1405--1421}, publisher = {{USENIX} Association}, year = {2018}, url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/lai}, timestamp = {Mon, 01 Feb 2021 08:43:20 +0100}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/uss/Lai0RCMS18.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
Password remains the most widespread means of authentication, especially on the Internet. As such, it is the Achilles heel of many modern systems. Facebook pioneered using external cryptographic services to harden password-based authentication in a large scale. Everspaugh et al. (USENIX Security ’15) provided the first comprehensive treatment of such a service and proposed the PYTHIA PRF-Service as a cryptographically secure solution. Recently, Schneider et al. (ACM CCS ’16) proposed a more efficient solution which is secure in a weaker security model.
In this work, we show that the scheme of Schneider et al. is vulnerable to offline attacks just after a single validation query. Therefore, it defeats the purpose of using an external crypto service in the first place and it should not be used in practice. Our attacks do not contradict their security claims, but instead show that their definitions are simply too weak. We thus suggest stronger security definitions that cover these kinds of real-world attacks, and an even more efficient construction, PHOENIX, to achieve them. Our comprehensive evaluation confirms the practicability of PHOENIX: It can handle up to 50% more requests than the scheme of Schneider et al. and up to three times more than PYTHIA.
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/uss/Lai0SC17, author = {Russell W. F. Lai and Christoph Egger and Dominique Schr{\"{o}}der and Sherman S. M. Chow}, editor = {Engin Kirda and Thomas Ristenpart}, title = {Phoenix: Rebirth of a Cryptographic Password-Hardening Service}, booktitle = {26th {USENIX} Security Symposium, {USENIX} Security 2017, Vancouver, BC, Canada, August 16-18, 2017}, pages = {899--916}, publisher = {{USENIX} Association}, year = {2017}, url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/presentation/lai}, timestamp = {Mon, 01 Feb 2021 08:43:05 +0100}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/uss/Lai0SC17.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/concur/HausmannSE16, author = {Daniel Hausmann and Lutz Schr{\"{o}}der and Christoph Egger}, editor = {Jos{\'{e}}e Desharnais and Radha Jagadeesan}, title = {Global Caching for the Alternation-free {\(\mu\)}-Calculus}, booktitle = {27th International Conference on Concurrency Theory, {CONCUR} 2016, August 23-26, 2016, Qu{\'{e}}bec City, Canada}, series = {LIPIcs}, volume = {59}, pages = {34:1--34:15}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"{u}}r Informatik}, year = {2016}, url = {https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2016.34}, doi = {10.4230/LIPICS.CONCUR.2016.34}, timestamp = {Mon, 26 Jun 2023 20:45:38 +0200}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/concur/HausmannSE16.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/raid/EggerSKV13, author = {Christoph Egger and Johannes Schlumberger and Christopher Kruegel and Giovanni Vigna}, editor = {Salvatore J. Stolfo and Angelos Stavrou and Charles V. Wright}, title = {Practical Attacks against the {I2P} Network}, booktitle = {Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses - 16th International Symposium, {RAID} 2013, Rodney Bay, St. Lucia, October 23-25, 2013. Proceedings}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {8145}, pages = {432--451}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2013}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41284-4\_22}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-41284-4\_22}, timestamp = {Tue, 14 May 2019 10:00:53 +0200}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/raid/EggerSKV13.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }
System software, especially operating systems, tends to be highly configurable. Like every complex piece of software, a considerable amount of bugs in the implementation has to be expected. In order to improve the general code quality, tools for static analysis provide means to check for source code defects without having to run actual test cases on real hardware. Still, for proper type checking a specific configuration is required so that all header include paths are available and all types are properly resolved.
In order to find as many bugs as possible, usually a "full configuration" is used for the check. However, mainly because of alternative blocks in form of #else-blocks, a single configuration is insufficient to achieve full coverage. In this paper, we present a metric for configuration coverage (CC) and explain the challenges for (properly) calculating it. Furthermore, we present an efficient approach for determining a sufficiently small set of configurations that achieve (nearly) full coverage and evaluate it on a recent Linux kernel version.
@article{DBLP:journals/sigops/TartlerLDES11, author = {Reinhard Tartler and Daniel Lohmann and Christian Dietrich and Christoph Egger and Julio Sincero}, title = {Configuration coverage in the analysis of large-scale system software}, journal = {{ACM} {SIGOPS} Oper. Syst. Rev.}, volume = {45}, number = {3}, pages = {10--14}, year = {2011}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/2094091.2094095}, doi = {10.1145/2094091.2094095}, timestamp = {Mon, 26 Oct 2020 08:24:58 +0100}, biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/journals/sigops/TartlerLDES11.bib}, bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org} }